Triangular trade: prescription for prosperity or disaster. Address by Sir Roy Denman, Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities, Washington, DC. San Francisco, 1983 by Denman, Roy.
;, 
TRIANGULAR  TRADE:  PRESCRIPTION  ' 
FOR  PROSPERITY  OR  DISASTER 
ADDRESS  BY  SIR  ROY  DENMAN 
HEAD  OF  THE  DELEGATION  OF  THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
WASHINGTON,  D.C. 
It is  appropria~e in San  Francisco  that  I  tr~ and  sketch out  the 
nature  and  the  future  of  the  links which extend  not  just across  the 
Atlantic but  across  the  Pacific  to Japan.  Because  no  one  can talk to 
businessmen here  without  realising that  the  East  Coast  is very far 
away  and  that  the  Pacific is here.  And  I  say  this  all  the more  because 
it is on  a  healthy and  harmonious  cooperation between  these  three 
pillars of  the  world  trading system,  the  United States,  Japan  and 
the  European  Community,  that the  survival  of  the  one-world  trading 
system  created  in 1947  depends.  And  with this  depends  the prosperity 
of  the West. 
I  do  not  need  to tell you  for  long  in San  Francisco about  the  stake 
which  the  United States has  in the  foreign  trade,  especially for  you 
in California,  the  leading  trading State which  would  rank eleventh in 
international  trade  if it were  a  separate  country.  For  something  like - 2  -
a  hundred  years  after the  Civil  War,  foreign  trade 1did not  account 
I 
for  more  than  3-4  percent  of  American  GNP.  Then  in' tihe  l970s  it 
I 
I 
took off.  In  1980 it accounted  for  nearly  9  percen~.  Something  like 
one-fifth of  American  industrial  production is exported.  Four  out  of 
five manufacturing  jobs created  in the  U.S.  between  1977  and  1980 
were  linked  to export. 
So  foreign trade  is vital  to  American  jobs  and  the  American  standard 
of  living. 
The  United  States,  the  EEC  and  Japan  together  account  for  40  percent 
or  more  of world  trade.  Over  one-half,  if you  count  trade  between 
the  Members  of  the  EEC,  so we  have  a  joint responsibility for  the 
survival  of  the  open world  trading system. 
But  we  face  a  number  of  dangers.  Some  of  these  are  in the  United 
States,  some  beyond  your  shores,  some  particularly linked  to  the 
trading relationship between  the  U.S.  and  the  EEC  on  erie  hand,  and, 
on  the  other hand,  the  relationship between  Japan,  the  U.S.  and  the 
EEC. 
First  ~he dangers  at  home. 
First  comes  the  recession,  longer  and  deeper  than  any  post-war 
depressions,  with unemployment  the  highest  since  the  1930s, - 3  -
A recovery  is  certain this year,  but  how  quickly  and  how  strong? 
The  indicators  are  given  on  conflicting signals  and  all this has 
not  exactly discouraged  protectionism. 
And  then the  strong dollar. 
When  you  have  unemployment  and  low  capacity utilisation,  the  pres-
sure  is usually  for  selective measures.  When  the dollar  is  over-
valued,  the  pressures  are  more  general.  Let  us  look  back  at  the 
1970s.  In  the  final  phase  of  the  breakdown  of the  Bretton Woods 
system,  the  dollar was  over-valued with  some  15  percent.  Result: 
the  Mills  Bill  and  the  Burke-Hartke  Bill. 
In  1976-77,  the  dollar was  again over-valued.  A number  of  times 
anti-dumping  or  countervailing duties  were  imposed,  or  escape 
clauses  invoked  rose  from  5  in  1975  to  26  in  1976.  In  1974  unemploy-
ment  was  high,  but  with  the  dollar  and  the  current  account  then  in 
equilibrium the  Trade  Act  - the basis  of  the  Tokyo  Round  was  passed. 
But  the dollar  is  now  substantially over  the  1980  level,  the  yen 
still substantially  lower. 
Result:  rising protectionism  and  the  struggle  in  Congress  over  the 
Domestic  Content  Bill,  a  Bill  in clear violation both of  the  prin-
ciples  of  the  GATT  and  the  Ministerial  Declaration of  the  GATT 
meeting  at  the  end  of  November. - 4  -
These  are  some  difficulties  to  be  seen  in  the  U.S.  But  of  course 
the  scene  ranges  wider  than  that.  What  is  badly  needed  in  1983 
worldwide  is  economic  expansion. 
Hopes  of  economic  recovery  may  already have  damaged  business  and 
consumer  confidence  so  that  spending  plans  continue  to  be  deferred 
and  financing constraints might  be  more  severe  than predicted. 
"Hope  deferred"  as  the  poet  said,  "maketh  the  heart  sick". 
Unless  we  can  break out  of  the  world  economic  recession  the  strains 
on  the  one  world  trading  system  are  going  to  be  greater  than  any-
thing we  have  seen  for  the  last  35  years. 
Then  our major  and  continuing  anxieties  about  the  ability of  debt-
ridden  countries  including  some  of  the  biggest  in the  developing 
world  - and  some  of  the  major  companies  - to  repay  and  reservice 
their bank borrowings. 
Then  the  strains  imposed  on  the world  trading  system  by  out  of 
line exchange  rates,  a  situation where  the  dollar  is  substantially 
over-valued  and  the  yen undervalued  is  a  recipe  for  mayhem. - -----------
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Then  we  come  to  the bilateral difficulties which exist  across  the 
i 
Atlantic  and  across  the  Pacific.  I 
First Japan: 
The  problems  of  the  Community  - and  I  may  add  the  United  States  -
with  Japan  are  ascribed  from  time  to  time  by  Japanese  commentators 
to  workshy  Europeans  and  Americans  facing efficient Japanese  com-
petition,  to  sheer  protectionism,  to  a  reluctance  to  adjust.  The 
picture  in reality is  a  different  one.  The  Community's  problems 
with Japan  stem  from  a  combination  of  three  factors.  Each  on its 
own  would  be  of  limited  import.  Taken  together,  like  the  chemicals 
in  a  dangerous  combination,  theycan create  an  explosion. 
The  first is  the  size  of  our  bilateral deficit with Japan.  In  1963 
the  ten present Members  of  the  European  Community  had  a  trivial 
86  million dollar deficit with Japan.  This  rocketed  to  some  500 
million  in  1970,  to  3.4 billion in  1975  and  nearly  10  billion in 
1982. 
At  the_same  time  Japanese  exports  to  Europe  in certain highly 
sensitive  areas  like  automobiles,  colour television tubes  and  sets, 
and  certain highly developed  machine  tools  rose  massively. -------------------------------~-------~--------------
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At  the  same  time  European business  found  it difficult year  in year 
out  to  penetrate  the  Japanese  market. 
I 
Taken  in isolation,  these  factors  are  not  all  in  themselves  decisive. 
We  run bilateral  surpluses  and  deficits  in turn with our  trading 
partners.  But  taken  together,  a  massive  and  increasing deficit, 
increasing  inroads  on  our  sensitive  industries  and  a  sense  that  our 
manufacturers  cannot  get  into  the  Japanese  market  to  the  same  extent 
as  they  can get  into other industrialised countries  of  the  world 
creates  an  incre~singly dangerous  climate. 
Let  me  give  just  a  few  figures  to  support  what  I  have  said. 
Total  Japanese  exports  of  manufactured  goods  in 1960  amounted  to 
3  billion dollars.  In  1981  the  figure  had  soared  to  136  billion 
dollars.  But  Japanese  imports  of manufactures  in  1960  at just under 
1  billion dollars  had  risen in  1981  to  only  28  billion dollars. 
Again  in  1980  theEuropean Community  imported manufactured  products 
equal  to  j~st under  800  dollars  per  head.  The  figure  for  the  United 
States  was  547  dollars,  the  figure  for  Japan  was  233.  Thus  Japan's 
imports  of manufactured  goods  are  about  the  same  value  as  those  of 
Switzerland,  an  economy  one-tenth of  that  of  Japan.  And  in per 
capita  terms  Japan  is  next  to last  among  Member  States  of the  OECD. 
The  percentage  of  total  imports  represented  by  manufactured  goods - 7  -
is equally striking  - 55  percent  in the  case  of  the  United States, 
46.5  percent  in the  case  of  the  Community  - only  22  percent  in the 
case  of Japan. 
These  figures  demonstrate  clearly than  any  long  argument  the  size 
of  an  imbalance  which  is putting  an  increasing strain on  the  world 
trading  system. 
We  have  therefore  over  a  period  of years  pressed  the  Japanese 
authorities  to  take  action in  a  number  of areas.  We  have  asked  for 
an  easement  of  tariffs,  fiscal  charges  and  quotas,  of what  we  con-
sider  to be  very restrictive  standards  and  testing  and  acceptance 
procedures  as  well  as  improvements  in  the  conditions  for  financial 
services  and  investments. 
We  have  asked  the  Japanese  to  provide  tangible  assurances  that  from 
1982  onwards  Japan will  pursue  a  policy of effective moderation 
towards  the European Community  as  a  whole  as  regards  Japanese  exports 
in sectors where  an  increase  in Japanese  exports  to  the  Community 
would  cause  significant problems,  notably  passenger  cars,  colour 
television sets  and  tubes,  and  certain machine  tools.  And  more  broadly 
we  have  emphasized  that  the  essential  argument  concerns  the  need  for 
Japan  to  open  up  its market.  This  relates  to  the effect of  Japanese 
trading  and  economic  policies  as  a  whole  and  the  need  to  achieve  a - 8  -
more  balanced  integration  - commensurate  with Japan's  international 
responsibilities  - of  the  Japanese  economy  with  that  of  its main 
industrialised partners  and  notably with  the  European  Community. 
With this  in mind  we  took  action last year  to  consult with Japan 
under  the  "nullification and  impairment"  provisions  of  the  GATT. 
We  thus  gave  notice that  if no  satisfactory adjustment  can be 
effected between us  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time  then we 
shall  need  to  consider  proceeding  to  take  the  matter  for  adjudication 
to  the  Contracting Parties  of  the  GATT.  We  have  now  so  decided. 
This  will  provide  the  GATT  with one  of its biggest  post-war  tests. 
In  the  meantime  we  have  made  some  progress.  In discussions  recently 
in Tokyo  we  were  able  to  agree  with  the  Japanese  Government  measures 
of restraint  on  their exports  to  the  Community  of  videotape  recorders 
and  television tubes  in particular,  even  more  importantly  on  a 
speeding  up  by  Japan of measures  to  simplify  testing requirements, 
and  in addition,  measures  of  industrial  cooperation.  These  are 
certainly positive  steps,  but  we  need  to watch carefully,  during 
the  rest of  this year,  the  progress  which  we  achieve  because  much 
depends  on  this  in  lessening the  tensions which  have  dogged  relations 
with Japan,  not  only  in Europe  but  also  in  the  United  States. - 9  -
Then  our  relations with  the  United  States: 
We  made  progress  at the end  of  last year  on  a  number  of  points: 
steel,  pipeline,  beginning of  a  search for  a  common  approach  to 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Bloc.  But  one  major  problem  remains. 
Agriculture  shows  all  the  signs  of  becoming  a  flashpoint  in U.S.-EEC 
relations  in  1983.  Let  me  make  six quick points: 
In  the  first place  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy is essential  to 
the  existence  of  the  European  Community.  Without  it there  would  not 
have  been  a  Community. 
In  the  second  place  its objective  is not  to  keep  out  foreign  farm 
products.  The  Community  is  the  American  farmers'  biggest  foreign 
customer.  In  1981  we  bought  9  billion dollars worth  of  farm  products 
from  the  U.S. 
Thirdly,  it is true  that  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  supports 
European  agriculture.  But  the  American  farmer  also enjoys  massive 
farm  income  support  from  Federal  funds,  more  in  terms  of dollar  per 
farmer  than  in  the  EEC. 
So  fourthly,  agricultural  subsidies were  recognised  in the  GATT  as 
a  fact  of  life.  What  was  agreed  in  the  Tokyo  Round  was  that  no  one 
should use  them  to take  more  than  a  fair  share  of world  farm  trade. - 10  -
We  think we  have  held  to  this  agreement. 
Fifthly,  the  Community  is not  to  blame  for  the  prob1lems  facing 
American  agriculture.  These  problems  are  a  result of high  interest 
rates,  a  strong dollar,  lower  sales  to  the  Soviet  Union,  record 
U.S.  harvests  and  the  world  recession. 
Finally  the  CAP  is not  immutable.  It  is  becoming  more  market 
oriented  and  adjusted  to  deal  with over-production. 
Let us  hope  that bearing  in mind  these  facts  and  building  on  the 
U.S.-EEC  agricultural  conversations  in January  and  February we  can 
find  solutions within our  existing systems  which  can  accomodate  our 
problems.  Individual  actions  can easily produce  counter-reactions, 
and  these  can escalate.  But  jaw-jaw,  as  Churchill  once  said  to 
Stalin,  is better than war-war. 
I  should  like  now  to mention  another  issue which  has  increasingly 
troubled  us  in recent  years  - extraterritoriality.  Now  I  know  this 
is  a  topic, which  has  long exercised  the  minds  of many  lawyers  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  But  it is not  just  an  interesting legal 
problem.  The  extraterritorial  application of  laws  has  also  important 
political  and  economic  implications. - 11  -
The  dispute  which erupted  last year  between  the  U.S.  and  Western 
Europe  over  U.S.  sanctions relating to  the  construction of the 
pipeline  from  Siberia to Western  Europe  was  a  dramatic  example 
of  the  problems  which  can occur  when  a  country  seeks  to  apply its 
laws  extraterritorially.  Happily  that particular  incident was 
brought  to  a  satisfactory close,  but  not until after much  intense 
diplomatic  activity,  court  cases  and  disruption of trade. 
As  the  U.S.  Export  Administration Act  is up  for  renewal  this  year 
and will certainly be  the  subject of  intense  debate  both within  and 
outside  Congress,  I  should  like  to recall  some  of  the  problems  which 
have  arisen for  us  under  the  existing  legislation. 
The  extraterritorial application that  the  U.S.  has  sought  to give 
to its export  controls  under  the  Act  has  caused  us  very real  concern. 
There  are  several  aspects  of  the  way  in which  the  Export  Administration 
Act  has  been used  which  are  of  particula~ concern  to us.  For  example: 
the  application of  U.S.  export  controls  to 
companies  incorporated  in the  Member  States 
of  the  European  Community,  but  owned  or  con-
trolled by  a  U.S.  company. - 12  -
the extension of  U.S.  controls  to  trade 
between  third countries  in goods  or  technology 
which were  originally of  U.S.  origin. 
We  do  not  believe  that  such  an extension of U.S.  jurisdiction is 
in conformity with  the  accepted principles  of  international  law. 
These kinds of  controls  are  not  only  in our  view  objectionable  on 
legal  grounds,  they  also  pose  serious political  and  economic  problems. 
U.S.  export  controls  can  be  introduced unilaterally,  for  example, 
for  the  furtherance  of  U.S.  foreign policy goals  which  are  not 
necessarily  shared  by  the  European  Community  and  its Member  States. 
We  too  have  our  own  foreign policy goals.  European  subsidiaries 
of  U.S.  companies  must  also  abide  by  the  laws  and  policies  of  the 
country  in which  they  are  incorporated.  It is unacceptable  to us 
that  these  companies  established  in a  Member  State of  the  Community 
be  considered  to be  subject  to  U.S.  law when  this suits  the  United 
States  Government.  Such  a  situation could  adversely affect  the 
European  Community's  attitude  towards  U.S.  investment  in Europe. 
The  extension of  U.S.  public export  controls  to  the  trade  between 
third countries  in  goods,  which  are  claimed  to  be  subject  to  U.S. 
jurisdiction is also objectionable  for  commercial  and  political 
reasons.  Many  industries  in the  Community  have  quite readily 
accepted  U.S.  know-how  in the  past  and  to  a  certain extent  have ------~----------------
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become  dependent  upon  them  for  their  own  productioti.  If it turns 
out  that  they may  become  subject  to  U.S.  jurisdict~on at  any 
moment,  they might  feel  constrained  to  change  their policy  and 
seek  technology  and  advanced  products  elsewhere. 
The  problems  caused  by  the  extraterritorial  application of  U.S. 
export  controls  are  compounded  by  the  fact  that  such controls  have 
been  applied  at times  retroactively,  long  after contracts have  been 
concluded  in good  faith. 
I  know  that  the  business  community  in the  United  States  is  as  pre-
occupied  as  we  are  about  the  problems  caused  by  extraterritorial 
and  retroactive  application of  U.S.  export  controls.  I  hope  that 
the  U.S.  Administration  and  Congress  will  also  respond  positively 
to  our  legitimate  concerns.  If not,  I  believe  that there will  be 
a  growing  tendency  amongst  countries  to  adopt  blocking legislation 
with  the  intent of negating  the  application of  U.S.  measures  in 
these  countries. 
Now,  I  certainly do  not wish  to give  you  the  impression  that it is 
the  intention of  the  European  Community  to  seek ways  of  thwarting 
U.S.  foreign  policy  or  national  security controls.  Indeed,  there 
was  a  firm  commitment  given by  the  European  Community  to  discuss 
with  the  United  States  a  broadranging  series of  problems  relating - 14  -
I 
to trade with  the  Soviet Union.  With  the  pipeline  debacle  we  have 
seen  the  dangers  inherent  in unilateral  actions  wit~ extraterritorial 
effect.  Through  cooperation and  coordination,  I  hope  we  can  avoid  a 
repeat  performance  of  such  an event. 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  tried today  to give  some  sketches  of  the  problems 
which  stretch across  the Atlantic  as  well  as  across  the Pacific.  If 
we  take  the  problems  in each  of  our  countries  and  the  more  general 
world~wide problems  the  list is  formidable  enough.  But  we  should 
regard  that not  as  a  reason  for  despair  but  as  a  challenge.  For 
as  that  shrewd  old man  Benjamin  Franklin  once  said  in Philadelphia 
after all  the  debate  about  the  powers  of  the  States  and  the  Federation 
had  ended,  "He  either hang  together,  or  we  hang  separately".  And 
that remains  as  true  today  for  us  all  as  it did  200  years  ago. 